Viewing CCTV from a phone means opening a route into the system from outside the building. The NCSA guideline of 2026, which is a recommendation and not law, says to change factory passwords and to govern P2P like any other remote access channel. Camera owners get a decision table for remote viewing and the link to Section 37 (1) of the PDPA.
- Item 3.1 of the NCSA guideline says to deal with factory passwords before use and not to expose cameras directly to the internet without need.
- Item 3.3.3.4 says to govern P2P and manufacturer cloud services like any remote access channel, and not to judge them by technology name.
- Item 5.1.1: no public or no-login share links without reason, and mobile devices should have a screen lock.
- Item 3.3.3.1 suggests at least four zones: cameras, recording, users and external access.
- PDPA Section 37 (1) requires appropriate security measures but does not list them.
The installer finishes, scans a QR code and says, 'You can watch it on your phone now.' The owner is pleased, because there is no need to go in to see whether customers have arrived. But that one sentence hides several questions. How does the picture reach the phone? Who else can use the same route? And is the camera's password still the one it shipped with?
Thailand's National Cyber Security Agency (NCSA) issued a CCTV security guideline on 29 September 2026 and touches this topic in several places: factory passwords in item 3.1, network segmentation and P2P services in item 3.3.3, and apps and mobile devices in item 5.1.1.
This article pulls those items together to answer one question: if you want to watch cameras from outside the house or shop, what should you set up first, and which route should you choose? For the whole starter list see seven starter steps for cameras already installed. The PDPA side, such as signs and giving footage to police, is in CCTV and the PDPA.
Why is a camera exposed directly to the internet the riskiest?
Because anyone, from anywhere, can try its login page. All of the protection then rests on two things, the password and the software inside the camera, and cameras are often devices that nobody updates after installation.
The guideline lists the risk factors for CCTV in its preface and picks out three that chain together: default credentials, no software updates, and remote access without suitable measures. The Thai original is quoted below, with the meaning in the note.
ความเสี่ยงอาจเกิดจากหลายปัจจัย เช่น การใช้ข้อมูลยืนยันตัวตนเริ่มต้น (เช่น รหัสผ่านจากโรงงาน) การไม่ปรับปรุงซอฟต์แวร์หรือเฟิร์มแวร์ การเปิดให้เข้าถึงจากระยะไกลโดยไม่มีมาตรการที่เหมาะสมItem 3.1 turns those three risks into starter measures. Step 1 says to deal with default credentials before use. Step 2 says not to expose cameras, recorders or management interfaces directly to the internet unless necessary, and to use approved channels. Step 3 says to use MFA for privileged accounts and remote access where the system supports it. These three are the core of this article.
Steps 1 and 2 are 'should do' from level B, the most basic level in the guideline. Step 3 is 'consider' at level B and 'should do' at levels E and H. Under item 1.5, 'should do' marks the main recommended measure; anyone choosing another way should be able to explain why.
How should factory passwords be handled, and what counts as a good enough password?
Change them before real use, on every device with a login, not just the cameras. Item 3.1 covers the defaults of cameras, recorders, management systems and apps, and item 3.4.4 gives a detailed set of measures.
| Measure | Status at level B | What it means in a shop or home |
|---|---|---|
| Change or manage default credentials before use | Should do | Go device by device: cameras, recorder, router and app accounts |
| Use a password or passphrase suited to the risk | Should do | Prefer a long memorable phrase to a short guessable word |
| Do not reuse one password across devices without reason | Should do | Use a password manager to generate a separate one per device |
| Change credentials when a leak is suspected or evidenced | Should do | Change when an installer who knew them leaves, or when a logged-in phone is lost |
| Store credentials in a protected way | Should do | No note stuck beside the recorder |
| Check for weak or leaked passwords where the process allows | Consider | If you use a password manager, turn on its leak alerts |
| Rate limiting or temporary lockout against guessing | Consider | Enable it if the recorder or app offers it |
| MFA for privileged accounts and remote access | Consider | Start with the owner account, then the others |
As for what a good password looks like, the guideline answers without a number, because devices support different limits. Item 3.4.4 closes with a principle buyers should keep in mind. The Thai original is quoted.
ไม่ควรกำหนดจำนวนอักขระหรือขนาดของข้อมูลยืนยันตัวตนเดียวสำหรับระบบทุกประเภท แต่ควรกำหนดคุณภาพของข้อมูลยืนยันตัวตนให้เหมาะสมกับความเสี่ยง และลดการพึ่งพารหัสผ่านเพียงปัจจัยเดียวสำหรับการเข้าถึงระบบและข้อมูลที่มีความสำคัญOn user accounts, item 3.4.3 asks you to separate viewer and administrator roles, use accounts that identify the person, avoid shared administrator accounts, close guest and unused accounts, and revoke access when duties end. All are 'should do' from level B. In a small business that means each person who watches the cameras has a view-only account, and the whole shop does not share one admin login.
If you want to watch cameras from outside, which route should you choose?
It depends on how often you need to watch, whether anyone looks after your network, and whether you accept footage passing through a manufacturer's servers. The guideline does not say one route is right. It sets a principle that every route must be governed like remote access, which item 5.1.1 applies to phones.
การเข้าถึงระบบ CCTV ผ่านโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ แท็บเล็ต หรือแอปพลิเคชันสามารถเพิ่มความสะดวกในการเฝ้าระวังและการตอบสนองต่อเหตุ แต่ควรได้รับการควบคุมในลักษณะเดียวกับช่องทางการเข้าถึงระบบจากระยะไกลอื่นThe table below arranges the options as a decision table. The author did the sequencing and wrote the 'author's note' column. The 'source in the guideline' column shows which item supports each row. The guideline does not name VPNs; it speaks of 'approved channels', and the author reads a VPN set up by an administrator as fitting that wording.
| If your situation is | Suitable route | Source in the guideline | Author's note |
|---|---|---|---|
| You only watch while you are on site | Open no external route at all; view over the internal network | Item 3.1 step 2 · item 3.3.3 | Safest, because there is no outside route for anyone to try. If you do not truly need outside viewing, do not enable it |
| You need to watch from outside now and then and have no IT support | The manufacturer's P2P or cloud app, provided you can answer the item 3.3.3.4 questions and turn on MFA | Item 3.3.3.4 · item 5.1.1 | Simplest for most people, but you must know whose servers carry the footage, where they are, and whether the service can be switched off |
| You have an installer or network administrator and want to stay in control | An approved channel the administrator sets up, such as a VPN into the network and then viewing on the internal network | Item 3.3.3.1 external access zone · item 3.3.3.2 | More control, but needs ongoing care, and the VPN itself needs a good password and MFA |
| An installer or manufacturer must support the system remotely | A temporary channel with limited rights and duration, access logged, closed when the job ends | Item 3.3.3.1 · item 3.3.4.2 · item 3.4.1 | Ask for written confirmation that it is closed. Item 3.3.4.2 makes closing temporary services at the end of work a 'should do' at level B |
| Port forwarding or UPnP so the camera is reachable on the internet directly | Not recommended; use one of the routes above | Item 3.1 step 2 · item 3.3.4.1 (turn UPnP off when not needed) | If there truly is no other way, it needs an approved reason, limits on who can connect, HTTPS and changed factory passwords |
| You want to send a link so relatives or friends can watch | Give each person a view-only account; no public links | Item 5.1.1 (sharing images or links) | A link that needs no login works for anyone who receives it, and links get forwarded |
One caution about the table: no row works without changing the factory password, because every route ends at a login that needs a good password and ideally MFA. And do not pick row four or five just because an installer says it is quick to set up.
Is P2P safe, and what should you ask the vendor before turning it on?
Item 3.3.3.4 says you cannot tell from the name. The guideline accepts that P2P makes remote viewing convenient. In general such apps connect to the camera through a manufacturer's central server, with no port opened on your router. It warns that the service must be governed to the same standard as other remote channels.
บริการเชื่อมต่อแบบ P2P หรือบริการคลาวด์ของผู้ผลิตอาจช่วยให้ผู้ใช้งานเข้าถึงระบบจากภายนอกได้สะดวก แต่ควรได้รับการกำกับในลักษณะเดียวกับช่องทางการเข้าถึงจากระยะไกลอื่นการใช้ P2P หรือ Cloud ไม่ควรถูกสรุปว่าปลอดภัยหรือไม่ปลอดภัยจากชื่อของเทคโนโลยีเพียงอย่างเดียว แต่ควรประเมินจากสถาปัตยกรรม การควบคุม และความเสี่ยงจริงThe guideline lists eight points to settle before use. The table turns them into questions an owner can put to a seller or check personally, in the author's wording.
| Point | Question to ask the seller or check yourself | Worrying answer |
|---|---|---|
| Connection route | Through which system or service does the app reach the camera? | The seller cannot say |
| Data sent out | What footage, device data or metadata reaches the provider? | No document explains it |
| Where the service runs | Where are the servers, according to what the provider discloses? | No country or sub-provider named |
| Who has access | Who on the provider's side can support or administer the system? | No limit or log of that access |
| Authentication | Does it support MFA? | No, yet it is the only way to view from outside |
| Control of the service | Can the service be switched off or restricted? | It cannot, or it switches itself back on after an update |
| Logging | Are sign-in logs available to review later? | None |
| Ending the service | If you stop using it, how is data moved or deleted? | No deletion process |
If the seller cannot answer more than half, the author's view is that this is a signal to use a route you control more directly, or to change models. If footage is kept on a cloud outside Thailand, a further PDPA layer on transfers abroad also arises; see our guide to cross-border transfers.
How should the phone and app used to watch cameras be set up?
Control them like any other remote channel, looking at the account, the app, the device and any footage left on the device. Item 5.1.1 sets out the points in a table, which the author turns into practical actions for an owner.
| Point in the guideline | What you can do now |
|---|---|
| User accounts | Give each person their own account; avoid shared accounts |
| MFA | Turn it on for privileged accounts and outside access when the service supports it |
| User rights | Limit who can review recordings, export data or change settings |
| Sharing images or links | Switch off public or no-login sharing unless there is a reason and a control |
| Mobile devices | Set a screen lock, use a supported operating system, do not modify the device in ways that weaken its security |
| Lost devices | Know how to cancel sessions or tokens and change the account password from another device |
| Saving footage to the device | Do not save images or clips to a personal gallery without need |
| App updates | Follow and install supported versions |
| Sign-in alerts | Turn them on where the system supports it |
The 'saving footage to the device' row is the one most often overlooked. Footage showing customers and staff, once saved on a personal phone, sits outside the system the shop controls, including deletion at the end of the retention period and limits on who can view it. If clips must go to police or another party, export them from the camera system through an approved and logged process.
For higher-risk systems, item 5.1.1 says a mobile device management (MDM) system or an equivalent measure may be considered. Most small shops need not go that far, but should start with the easy items: a screen lock, and cancelling sessions when a phone is lost.
How should the network be split so a compromised camera does not spread?
Keep cameras apart from the computers and phones used for everyday work. Item 3.3.3 asks for defence in depth and for devices not to be trusted merely because they sit on the same network. Its reasoning is straightforward.
การแบ่งเครือข่ายช่วยลดผลกระทบเมื่ออุปกรณ์หนึ่งถูกโจมตี และช่วยจำกัดการเคลื่อนย้ายของภัยคุกคามไปยังระบบอื่นItem 3.3.3.1 gives four example zones, which the author summarises in the table below. The guideline says the number of zones can be adapted to the real system, and the measure 'separate the CCTV network from the general user network as appropriate' is a 'should do' from level B.
| Zone | What is in it | Control suggested by the guideline | In a small shop this may mean |
|---|---|---|---|
| Camera / edge | Cameras, encoders, edge devices | Limit communication to the recorder or required systems, and limit outbound connections | Cameras can talk only to the recorder |
| Recording and management | NVR/DVR/VMS, storage, management server | Limit which users and systems can reach it | The recorder is not on the same network as the till and office PCs |
| Users / control | The machines of those who watch | Authenticate and set rights by role | Each person has their own account on the viewing machine |
| External access | Remote support or external administrators | Approved channels only, limited rights and time, access logged | The phone route and any installer route must be approved |
For a shop without advanced network gear, the author suggests two shortcuts: a second router used only for cameras and recorder, or a separate IoT network if the router supports one. Both are the author's suggestions; the guideline says to separate as appropriate and does not prescribe a method.
If cameras or the recorder connect to a building control system, automatic doors or other operational technology (OT), item 3.3.3.3 adds a specific caution, quoted in Thai and explained below.
หากระบบ CCTV เชื่อมต่อหรือใช้โครงสร้างพื้นฐานร่วมกับระบบเทคโนโลยีปฏิบัติการ (Operational Technology: OT) ระบบบริหารอาคาร หรือระบบควบคุมอื่น ควรพิจารณาผลกระทบระหว่างระบบทั้งสองด้าน ควรหลีกเลี่ยงการเชื่อมต่อโดยตรงโดยไม่มีการกำหนดขอบเขตและการควบคุมที่ชัดเจนPorts and services are the other matter. Item 3.3.4 says to enable only necessary services. The example table in item 3.3.4.1 says to avoid Telnet where a safer option exists, to turn off or restrict unencrypted HTTP where an encrypted channel is available, to turn UPnP off when not needed, and to enable P2P or cloud connectivity only when approved, since it is an outbound channel that must be governed. Ask the installer for the list of ports and services actually open, with the reason for each.
How does PDPA Section 37 (1) connect to a camera exposed to the internet?
Once a camera records identifiable people, the footage is personal data, and the data controller has a duty under Section 37 (1) of the Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) to provide appropriate security measures. A camera left on the internet with a factory password is something to weigh against these words.
provide appropriate security measures for preventing the unauthorized or unlawful loss, access to, use, alteration, correction or disclosure of Personal Data, and such measures must be reviewed when it is necessary, or when the technology has changed in order to efficiently maintain the appropriate security and safety.
What the statute does not contain is a list of measures. The PDPA does not say you must change factory passwords, enable MFA or avoid P2P, so it cannot be said that the law bans or requires them. What you can do is use the NCSA guideline as a yardstick for what 'appropriate' measures for a camera might include, and keep records that you did them. The legal outcome is decided case by case, and the author does not claim that following the guideline guarantees compliance with Section 37.
A second point is Section 37 (2). When footage is given to another provider that is not the controller, such as a camera maker's cloud, the controller must act to prevent that party from using or disclosing the data without authority or unlawfully. The author considers the eight-point table from item 3.3.3.4 a reasonable starting point for checking this, and where the provider processes on the shop's instructions a data processing agreement is advisable. See our guide to processor agreements.
Third, if a camera is accessed without authority and footage leaks, Section 37 (4) requires the controller to notify the Office without delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware, unless the breach is unlikely to risk people's rights and freedoms. The steps are in our 72-hour breach guide, and the minimum standard the Committee announced is covered in the minimum security standard checklist.
How long does a check of your own cameras take, and what should you look at?
The author estimates half an hour to an hour for ten cameras or fewer. That is the author's estimate and not a figure from the guideline. The list runs from the quickest risk reducers onward.
- Log in to every device with the credentials the installer gave you. If they are still the defaults or something others can guess, change them now and note who holds the new ones.
- Open the router's admin page and read Port Forwarding and UPnP. Delete rules pointing at cameras or the recorder unless there is a reason for them.
- Ask the installer, or check the app, whether P2P or the manufacturer's cloud is used, then work through the eight-point table.
- Turn on MFA for the owner account and the recovery email where the service supports it.
- Review who has accounts that can view the cameras. Close guest accounts, unused accounts and those of people who have left.
- Check the phones that have the viewing app. They need a screen lock, a supported operating system and no footage left in the gallery.
- Look for public share links still active. If there is no reason to keep one, close it.
It breaks steps 1 and 2 of item 3.1 together; change the passwords and move to an approved route at once.
It follows item 3.3.3.4: govern P2P like other remote channels and assess it from actual architecture.
Item 5.1.1 says not to open public or unauthenticated sharing without reason and suitable control.
Item 3.3.4.2 makes closing temporary services after installation or maintenance a 'should do' at level B.
Item 5.1.1 says not to save CCTV footage or data to personal storage without need; the footage leaves the shop's control.
Frequently asked questions
Is it safe to view cameras from a phone through the manufacturer's app?
Item 3.3.3.4 of the NCSA guideline does not judge by technology name. It asks for assessment from the real architecture, controls and risk, and for governance like any remote channel. Before use, answer eight points, such as what data leaves, where servers are, and whether MFA is supported.
Is changing the factory password enough?
No. The password is only the first gate. Item 3.1 also asks you not to expose cameras directly to the internet without need, to track firmware updates, and to use MFA for privileged accounts where supported. The guideline sets no fixed password length, but asks you to reduce reliance on a password as the only factor.
If I follow the NCSA guideline, have I met PDPA Section 37?
That cannot be concluded. The guideline is a recommendation with no binding force, while Section 37 (1) requires appropriate measures in line with the minimum standard the Committee announces. Following the guideline with records helps show what measures you had, but the legal outcome is decided case by case.
Is the safest choice to disable viewing from outside altogether?
In terms of risk, yes, because there is no external route for anyone to try. If the business must watch from outside, choose a route you can govern using the decision table. The guideline does not forbid remote access; it asks that it run through approved channels with suitable measures.
Can staff watch cameras from their own phones?
Item 5.1.1 does not prohibit it, but asks for individual accounts, limited rights, a screen lock, a supported operating system, no unnecessary saving of footage, and the ability to cancel sessions if the device is lost. A shop should set this out in writing for staff.
Do I need a VPN to view cameras from outside?
The guideline does not name VPNs; it speaks of approved channels. A VPN set up by an administrator is one route the author considers consistent with that idea, but it needs ongoing care, and the VPN also needs a good password and MFA.
Law and sources
- Thailand CCTV Security Guidelines v1.0.0 (NCSA · guidance, not law) — Clause 3.3.3 · Clause 3.3.3.1–3.3.3.4 · Clause 3.3.4 · Clause 3.4.1 · Clause 3.4.3 · Clause 3.4.4 · Clause 5.1.1
- Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) — Section 37 (1) (2) (4)
Text in the "The text" boxes is copied word for word from AIPDPA's legal knowledge base, transcribed from the Royal Gazette and official documents; every edit is checked by the system against that base, character by character. English wording is an unofficial translation; the Thai text prevails. This article is general information, not legal advice for a particular case.

